top of page

Berlin Policy Dialogue: Belarus as a Vector of Hybrid Threats

4 days ago
4 min read

On 5 November 2026, the Berlin Policy Dialogue "Belarus as a Vector of Hybrid Threats: Disinformation, the Regime and the Response" took place at Hotel Aquino in Berlin. It was organised by Capacity for Democracy e.V., RADAR_BY, Digital Skills Coalition Belarus, the Heinrich Böll Foundation and Dialogbüro Vienna, with funding from the German Federal Foreign Office. The dialogue presented preliminary findings of the project "Countering Hybrid Threats: OSINT and AI Training for Belarusian Journalists" and turned them into recommendations for German and European policymakers.


Daniel George (Capacity for Democracy) and Vasil Navumau (RADAR_BY) opened the day with an overview of the project: OSINT and AI workshops, a fellowship programme, collaborative investigations and the Belarus Disinformation Map.


Keynotes

Viktar Babaryka argued that the fight against propaganda cannot be reduced to counter-propaganda. Constantly reacting to someone else's narratives keeps us trapped in a framework imposed by others and gradually erodes trust in information sources. For Belarusians at home and in exile, this means staying connected with those inside the country, not building communication solely as a response to the regime, and creating their own communities, agenda and civic infrastructure. He stressed that trust cannot be built through six-month grant cycles, that support should also reach those who speak about everyday life in Belarus, and that the EU needs to speak not only about Belarusians, but with them.


Ales Bialiatski, human rights defender and Nobel Peace Prize laureate, emphasised the strategic importance of supporting the Belarusian language in public life and education. He described the formula "this is simply how history developed" as a key propaganda argument used to justify the marginalisation of the Belarusian language and historical memory, the weakening of religious and educational institutions, and the narrowing of Belarusian history to a Soviet and wartime narrative. Belarusians, he said, have the right to truth and to choose a government that will lead the country in a democratic direction.


Panel: Belarus as a vector of hybrid threats

The panel, moderated by Hanna Liubakova (Atlantic Council), brought together Viktar Babaryka, Ales Bialiatski and Johannes Schraps, Member of the German Bundestag (SPD), with comparative input from Ukraine and Georgia.


Olga Matveieva (Paderborn University; Ukrainian Expert Foundation) spoke about the vulnerability of smaller countries in a digital space dominated by a few Big Tech companies, whose platforms and AI tools are not neutral. Drawing on the project "Bridges of Truth", she showed how Ukrainian local newsrooms, often only two or three people and frequently run by women, survive war, power outages and cyberattacks through trust, local knowledge and mutual support rather than technological superiority.


Vazha Tavberidze (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty) argued that what is at stake in Georgia is sovereignty: a country can keep its flag and borders while losing its ability to act independently. Belarus shows that a protest movement can be worn down rather than crushed, and in both countries the government presents itself as the only guarantee against war. Europe, he concluded, needs credible consequences for repression and sustained support for independent media and civil society, always distinguishing a government from the society it claims to represent.


Preliminary findings and the Belarus Disinformation Map

Viktoryia Andrukovich (RADAR_BY), Mikalai Kvantaliani and Mikhail Doroshevich (Digital Skills Coalition Belarus) presented the Belarusian disinformation ecosystem in five maps, built from one dataset of state and pro-regime actors on Telegram, YouTube and TikTok for January–June 2026: who copies whom, who attacks whom, when the attacks come, how they attack, and where the audience is. Manipulation techniques were coded with DISARM, the framework used by EU institutions. The full results will be published in the final research report.


The research team drew four messages for Europe: monitor the deniable layer of anonymous channels, not only state media; treat Belarus as an actor of foreign information manipulation in its own right, not just a relay for Moscow; measure what enforcement actually achieves; and share evidence in common formats that EU systems can use.


Recommendations for Germany and the EU

In the afternoon, participants worked in four groups:

  • Distinguishing vulnerabilities. Belarusian and Ukrainian needs should not be mixed in one funding call: Belarusians in Germany do not have the temporary protection available to Ukrainians. Participants called for raising awareness of Belarusians' specific problems with identity documents, which are now resolved case by case rather than by clear rules, and for strategic consultations on rising security concerns.

  • Cross-border research and monitoring. Research should serve institutions that counter disinformation, including independent media, and support a clear national-level position on Belarus. At EU level: common data policies and standards, shared datasets, a focus on Belarusian actors, and research that offers solutions, with realistic ambitions.

  • Connecting journalists, researchers and institutions. Priorities: the security of people at risk, community support, engaging EU institutions and media organisations, cooperation within small communities, and professional solidarity, for example through university welcome centres.

  • Sustainable funding. Building networks through capacity-building initiatives aimed at civic initiatives, donors and local governments; combining start-up and institutional support; working on audiences inside Belarus, not only in the exile community; security; and better explaining the added value of research.


The recommendations will feed into the project's final research report and a separate policy paper.



Comments


© RADAR_BY and Vasil Navumau

bottom of page